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Abstract
We study an asymmetric duopoly market in which the firms’ products are initially differen-
tiated in both variety and quality. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality
valuation. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on product
qualities. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price com-
petition. For the customization stage we consider two different games: the simultaneous-move
game and the endogenous-timing game. In the latter, whether customization choices are made
simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously determined. We show that both quality and the
timing of customization choices play important roles in determining the equilibrium outcome.
Customization occurs only if the quality difference is sufficiently large. Endogenous timing some-
times enables the firms to achieve an outcome that is Pareto superior to that if they were to make
their customization choices simultaneously. Although the higher quality firm is more likely to
customize, endogenous timing sometimes enables the lower quality firm to obtain an advantage
that it would not have in the simultaneous-move game.
Key words: customization, horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation, endogenous timing.
JEL codes: D43, L13, C72.
∗This paper combines two working papers previously circulated under the titles “Mass Customization with Vertically
Differentiated Products” and “Customization in an Endogenous-Timing Game with Vertical Differentiation.”
†Department of Economics, University of Missouri, 118 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. E-mail:
loginovao@missouri.edu, phone: 1-573-882-0063, fax: 1-573-882-2697 (corresponding author).
‡Department of Economics, University of Missouri, 118 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. E-mail:
wangx@missouri.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Customization is a flexible technology designed to produce individually tailored products without
significantly compromising cost efficiency. Advances in Internet-based information technologies and
improvements in manufacturing flexibility have made customization a reality in many product cat-
egories. For example, Dell builds to order notebook and desktop computers; NikeID.com allows
consumers to create their most preferred athletic pair of shoes; Timbuk2 customizes messenger bags
and backpacks; apparel vendor LandsEnd.com offers custom-crafted pants and shirts.
Most of the existing theoretical literature on customization adopt one-dimensional horizontal
differentiation settings (e.g., Dewan, Jing, and Seidmann 2003, Syam and Kumar 2006, Alexandrov
2008, and Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk 2008). Customization enables consumers to get their ideal
products represented by their locations in the product attribute space. Firms are symmetrical and
make symmetric choices in equilibrium.1 Even though many important aspects of customization are
captured by these studies, important issues have yet to be examined. Casual empiricism indicates
that (i) some firms customize, some do not; (ii) firms may not make their customization choices at
the same time; and (iii) higher quality firms are more likely to offer customization. The goal of the
present paper is to incorporate these observations into product customization competition.
We study an industry in which products are characterized by variety and quality. Variety is a
horizontal attribute and quality is a vertical attribute.2 Consumer preferences are heterogenous in
two dimensions. In particular, each consumer has a most preferred variety and a quality valuation.
There are two firms that initially produce standard products located at the end points of the variety
space. The firms are asymmetrical due to having different qualities. Customization provides ideal
varieties for consumers but has no effect on product qualities. The model has two stages. The first
is the customization stage, in which the firms select their product types (standard or customized).
In the second stage – the pricing stage – the firms engage in price competition.
We consider two different games to model the customization stage. In one game the firms si-
multaneously decide whether to customize their products. In the other game the customization
stage unfolds in two periods. Each firm either selects its product type in period 1 or postpones this
decision to period 2. Thus, whether the customization choices are made simultaneously or sequen-
tially is endogenously determined. While the first game focuses on issues related to observations (i)
and (iii) above, the second game addresses all three observations. We will call the first game the
simultaneous-move game and the second the endogenous-timing game.
Industrial organization economists have long been interested in whether firms choose their prices
and/or quantities simultaneously or sequentially. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990, 1993) were the first
to introduce a model in which the determination of simultaneity versus sequentiality of moves is
endogenous.3 The structure of our endogenous-timing game follows Hamilton and Slutsky (1993),
1An exception is Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk (2008) in which asymmetric firms are considered.
2Our basic model is based on the literature that combines horizontal and vertical differentiation, e.g., Economides
(1989) and Neven and Thisse (1990).
3Many subsequent studies have examined endogenous timing and related issues in standard price and/or quantity
duopoly games, e.g., Matsumura (1999) and Amir and Stepanova (2006).
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in which the basic game is given by a 2× 2 matrix and the extended game has two periods. This is
the simplest possible setup to model firms’ flexibility in choosing when to move.
The paper on customization that is closest to ours is Syam, Ruan, and Hess (2005). In both pa-
pers the consumer space is two-dimensional. Syam et al. (2005) endow products with two horizontal
attributes, for which consumers have heterogeneous preferences. The firms are initially maximally
differentiated with respect to both attributes. They first simultaneously choose whether to cus-
tomize both, one, or none of the attributes, then compete in prices. The key difference between
Syam et al. (2005) and our study is that they work with ex ante symmetric firms and examine how
the possibility of customizing multiple attributes affect customization choices, whereas we work with
asymmetric firms and focus on the roles of quality difference and endogenous timing in customization
competition.
Another closely related paper is Bernhardt, Liu, and Serfes (2007), in which ex ante symmetric
firms first acquire information about consumers and then customize their products as best as they
can to match consumer needs. Similar to our paper, consumer preferences are two-dimensional,
corresponding to two attributes of the product, and the second attribute – brand loyalty – cannot
be customized. There are two main differences between Bernhardt et al. (2007) and our study.
First, Bernhardt et al. (2007) emphasize the cost side of customization, whereas our focus is shifted
towards the strategic effects of customization. Second, brand loyalty is a horizontal attribute, not
vertical as quality in our paper is.
A number of papers have studied customization using a one-dimensional consumer space. Dewan
et al. (2003) assume that customizing firms price discriminate. Syam and Kumar (2006) examine the
role of standard products in customization competition. Alexandrov (2008) extends Salop’s (1979)
model in which firms can offer interval-long adjustable “fat” products. In a dynamic setting Chen
(2006) studies two marketing innovations, one of which is essentially a form of product customization.
While these studies assume symmetric firms, in Mendelson and Parlaktu¨rk (2008) one firm has a
margin advantage (higher difference between reservation price and unit cost) over the other.
The present paper as well as Syam et al. (2005) model customization as zero-one decisions, so
that all customers of a customizing firm get their most preferred varieties. In contrast, all the other
papers mentioned above treat customization as continuous choices. Both approaches match aspects
of reality and have their advantages. With zero-one decisions, more attention can be devoted to
the strategic effects of customization. With continuous customization choices, one can focus on how
efficiency considerations determine the range of customization.
Our equilibrium analysis shows that quality difference and endogenous timing play important
roles in determining the equilibrium outcome. In particular, no firm will customize if the quality
difference is small, regardless of the fixed cost of customization. Intuitively, customization by one or
both firms makes their products less differentiated, thus intensifying price competition. The smaller
is the quality difference, the tougher is price competition. For sufficiently large quality differences,
customization by one or both firms may occur. Because the high quality firm benefits more from
customization than the low quality firm, the high quality firm is more likely to customize.
We show that the endogeneity of timing in the customization stage is an additional strategic tool
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for the firms. It sometimes enables the firms to achieve an outcome that is Pareto superior to that
if they were to make their customization decisions simultaneously. While the low quality firm never
customizes alone in the simultaneous-move game, in the endogenous-timing game it may obtain an
advantage by becoming the first and only firm to customize.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. In
Section 3 the pricing stage is analyzed. In Sections 4 and 5 we study the firms’ customization choices
in the simultaneous-move game and the endogenous-timing game, respectively. Concluding remarks
are provided in Section 6. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which each product i is characterized by its variety xi ∈ [0, 1] and its quality
qi ≥ 0. The first characteristic corresponds to horizontal differentiation and the second to vertical
differentiation. Consumers are heterogenous in two dimensions. Each consumer has a most preferred
variety x ∈ [0, 1] and a quality valuation y ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer of type (x, y) derives the following
utility from buying one unit of product i:
v + qiy − t|x− xi| − pi,
where v is a positive constant, t is a preference parameter, and pi is the price of product i. Consumers
as represented by (x, y) are uniformly distributed over the unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] with a total mass
of 1. We assume that v is large enough for all consumers to find a product that yields positive payoff
in equilibrium.
There are two firms, A and B, operating with zero marginal costs of production. Initially, firm
A offers a single (standard) product of quality qA and variety xA = 0, whereas firm B offers a single
product of quality qB > qA and variety xB = 1. That is, firm B is the higher quality firm and the
two firms have maximum variety differentiation.
We will normalize t to 1. This amounts to a monotonic transformation of preferences. The
utilities of a consumer of type (x, y) from buying firm A’s and firm B’s standard product are
v + qAy − x− pA (1)
and
v + qBy − (1− x)− pB, (2)
respectively.
Investing K ≥ 0 into product-customization technology allows a firm to produce a product that
exactly matches a given consumer’s preferred variety. The utilities of type (x, y) from buying firm
A’s and firm B’s customized product are
v + qAy − pA (3)
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and
v + qBy − pB. (4)
We consider two different games: the simultaneous-move game and the endogenous-timing game.
Both games have two stages, a customization stage followed by a pricing stage. The difference
between the two games is in the customization stage. In the simultaneous-move game, the firms
choose simultaneously whether to customize their products. In the the endogenous-timing game the
customization stage involves two periods. Each firm selects its product type (standard or customized)
in period 1 or postpones this decision to period 2. Thus, whether the product type choices are made
simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously determined. After the product types are chosen, the
firms enter the pricing stage, in which they choose prices simultaneously. Consumers decide which
product to purchase, and the profits are realized. We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and
use backward induction to solve the two games.
3 Analysis of the Pricing Stage
The customization stage leads to four possible outcomes: both firms choose standard products (SS),
only firm A customizes (CS), only firm B customizes (SC), and both firms customize (CC). We next
investigate the firms’ pricing decisions following each of these outcomes.
3.1 Equilibrium Prices Following SS
Suppose both firms selected standard products. Utilities from firm A’s and firm B’s standard
products are given by (1) and (2). Therefore, for a given level of quality valuation y, the marginal
consumer type in terms of variety x is
x̂(y) =
1
2
(1− qy + pB − pA) , (5)
where
q ≡ qB − qA
denotes the quality difference between the firms’ products. For any y ∈ [0, 1], consumers in the
interval x ∈ [0, x̂(y)] will purchase from firm A, whereas those with x ∈ (x̂(y), 1] will purchase from
firm B. There are four possible positions for the indifference line (5), as illustrated in Figure 1. The
slope of the indifference line equals −2/q. An increase in q makes the line flatter. An increase in pB
(and/or decrease in pA) shifts the line to the right, thereby reducing the market size of firm B.
Let DA(pA, pB) and DB(pA, pB) denote the demand functions of firms A and B. The expressions
for these functions depend on the position of the indifference line.4 The firms choose simultaneously
pA and pB to maximize their profits,
ΠA(pA, pB) = DA(pA, pB)pA
4The details are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Indifference line and market areas
and
ΠB(pA, pB) = DB(pA, pB)pB.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium prices and profits following SS). Suppose both firms selected standard prod-
ucts in the customization stage, then the equilibrium prices and profits in the pricing stage are as
follows.
(i) If q ≤ 3/2, {
pSSA = 1− 16q
pSSB = 1 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠSSA =
1
2
(
1− 16q
)2
ΠSSB =
1
2
(
1 + 16q
)2
(ii) If q ∈ (3/2, 3],
{
pSSA =
1
8
(
1 +
√
1 + 16q
)
pSSB =
1
8
(−5 + 3√1 + 16q) and

ΠSSA =
1
q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)3
ΠSSB =
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8
(iii) If q > 3, {
pSSA =
1
3q
pSSB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠSSA =
1
9q
ΠSSB =
4
9q
It is easy to verify that the corresponding prices and profits in parts (i) and (ii) are equal when
evaluated at q = 3/2. Similarly, the prices and profits in parts (ii) and (iii) are equal at q = 3.
Therefore, the equilibrium prices and profits vary continuously when q changes.
Case (i) corresponds to Figure 1(a) in which q is small. In equilibrium, both firms serve consumers
with all quality valuations, and each firm attracts consumers closer to its position on the variety
interval. Case (ii) corresponds to Figure 1(b). Firm A attracts only consumers who are close to
its variety position and have low quality valuations (i.e., small x’s and small y’s). Firm B uses
its quality advantage to capture all the other consumers. Case (iii) corresponds to Figure 1(c) in
which quality difference q is large. In this case, the low quality firm A competes aggressively and
the high quality firm B does better setting a high price and exploiting consumers with high quality
valuations. In equilibrium, firm A serves consumers of all variety preferences, and so does firm B.
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Firm A attracts consumers with low quality valuations and firm B attracts consumers with high
quality valuations.
It is worthwhile to note the intuitive outcome implied by Lemma 1 that in all three cases firm B
sets a higher price, serves a larger market area, and earns a higher profit than firm A. Furthermore,
Figure 1(d) does not arise in equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium Prices Following CS
Suppose firm A selected a customized product and firm B selected a standard product. Utilities from
firm A’s customized product and firm B’s standard product are given by (3) and (2). Therefore, for
a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
x̂(y) = 1− qy + pB − pA, (6)
from which we can calculate the demand and profit functions for the firms. Lemma 2 presents the
equilibrium prices and profits following outcome CS.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium prices and profits following CS). Suppose firm A selected a customized
product and firm B selected a standard product in the customization stage, then the equilibrium
prices and profits in the pricing stage are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1, {
pCSA =
2
3 − 16q
pCSB =
1
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠCSA =
(
2
3 − 16q
)2
ΠCSB =
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If q > 1, {
pCSA =
1
3q +
1
6
pCSB =
2
3q − 16
and
{
ΠCSA =
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2
ΠCSB =
1
q
(
2
3q − 16
)2
Note that the critical values for the cases in this lemma are different from those in Lemma 1,
and that the pricing equilibrium following CS leads to only two possible positions of the indifference
line. This is due to the fact that the slope of the indifference line (6) is −1/q, which is different
from that of (5).
Case (i) of Lemma 2 corresponds to Figure 1(a) in which quality difference q is small. Cus-
tomization enables firm A to overcome its quality disadvantage. Firm A’s equilibrium price, market
size, and profit are higher than those of firm B. In equilibrium, both firms serve consumers with all
quality valuations, and each firm attracts consumers closer to its position on the variety interval.
To explain why firm B still attracts consumers with low quality valuations, it suffices to consider
consumers with y = 0. Such consumers do not gain any extra utility buying from the high quality
firm, yet some of them are attracted by firm B because of its low price. Case (ii) corresponds to
Figure 1(c) in which quality difference q is large. In this case, customization does not overcome
the quality disadvantage of firm A. In equilibrium, firm A’s price, market size, and profit are lower
than those of firm B. Firm A serves consumers of all variety preferences and so does firm B. Firm
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A attracts consumers with low quality valuations and firm B attracts consumers with high quality
valuations.
3.3 Equilibrium Prices Following SC
Suppose firm A selected a standard product and firm B selected a customized product. Utilities from
firm A’s standard product and firm B’s customized product are given by (1) and (4). Therefore, for
a given y, the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
x̂(y) = −qy + pB − pA. (7)
The next lemma presents the equilibrium prices and profits following outcome SC.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium prices and profits following SC). Suppose firm A selected a standard product
and firm B selected a customized product in the customization stage, then the equilibrium prices and
profits in the pricing stage are as follows.
(i) If q ≤ 1/2, {
pSCA =
1
3 − 16q
pSCB =
2
3 +
1
6q
and
{
ΠSCA =
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
ΠSCB =
(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2
(ii) If q ∈ (1/2, 2], {
pSCA =
1
4
√
2q
pSCB =
3
4
√
2q
and
{
ΠSCA =
1
16
√
2q
ΠSCB =
9
16
√
2q
(iii) If q > 2, {
pSCA =
1
3q − 16
pSCB =
2
3q +
1
6
and
{
ΠSCA =
1
q
(
1
3q − 16
)2
ΠSCB =
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2
Case (i) corresponds to Figure 1(a), case (ii) to 1(b), and case (iii) to 1(c). Firm B’s quality
advantage is reinforced by customization, pushing the critical values lower compared to those in
Lemma 1.
3.4 Equilibrium Prices Following CC
Suppose both firms selected customized products. Utilities from firm A’s and firm B’s customized
products are given by (3) and (4). Therefore, consumers with y ≤ (pB − pA)/q will purchase from
firm A, those with y > (pB − pA)/q will purchase from firm B. The firms’ profit functions are
ΠA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) pA and ΠB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) pB.
The profit maximizing first-order conditions{
pB − 2pA = 0
q + pA − 2pB = 0
8
lead immediately to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium prices and profits following CC). Suppose both firms selected customized
products in the customization stage, then the equilibrium prices and profits in the pricing stage are
given by: {
pCCA =
1
3q
pCCB =
2
3q
and
{
ΠCCA =
1
9q
ΠCCB =
4
9q
In equilibrium the indifference line is horizontal at 1/3 from the bottom side of the unit square.
That is, firm A serves all consumers with quality valuations less than 1/3, and firm B serves the
rest. The result here is the same as in the standard model of vertical differentiation.
Having derived the profit functions for the pricing stage, we move one step back to study the
customization stage. In the next section we study the simultaneous-move game, in Section 5 the
endogenous-timing game.
4 Simultaneous-Move Game
In the customization stage of the simultaneous-move game, each firm has two possible strategies:
choosing a standard product (S) or choosing a customized product (C). This stage is represented
by the following matrix.
Firm B
Firm A
S C
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
It follows that
(S,S)
(C,S)
(S,C)
(C,C)
 is a Nash equilibrium if

K ≥ max {c1, r1}
K ∈ [r2, c1]
K ∈ [c2, r1]
K ≤ min {c2, r2}
where
c1 ≡ ΠCSA −ΠSSA and c2 ≡ ΠCCA −ΠSCA
denote firm A’s change in gross profit in the two columns, and
r1 ≡ ΠSCB −ΠSSB and r2 ≡ ΠCCB −ΠCSB
denote firm B’s change in gross profit in the two rows.
Lemma 5 (Relative gains from customization). For any value of q, max{c1, c2} < min{r1, r2}.
Detailed expressions for c1, c2, r1, and r2 as functions of q are provided in the Appendix. This
lemma stipulates that the low quality firm A always gains less from customization than the high
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r1
c2
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(S,C)
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0.63
Figure 2: Equilibrium customization choices in the simultaneous-move game
quality firm B.
It follows from Lemma 5 that the simultaneous-move game has a unique Nash equilibrium except
for K = c2 and K = r1. For ease of presentation without affecting the results, we will select (C,C)
as the Nash equilibrium at K = c2 and (S,C) at K = r1. Accordingly,
(S,S)
(S,C)
(C,C)
 is the Nash equilibrium if

K > r1
K ∈ (c2, r1]
K ≤ c2
Because K is non-negative, the above discussion implies that the signs of c2 and r1 are crucial
for equilibrium analysis. Specifically, when both c2 and r1 are negative (S,S) is the Nash equilibrium
for any K. When c2 < 0 and r1 > 0, either (S,C) or (S,S) is the Nash equilibrium, depending on K.
When both c2 and r1 are positive, the Nash equilibrium can be (C,C), (S,C), or (S,S).
The next proposition summarizes our main results on customization choices in the simultaneous-
move game.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium customization choices in the simultaneous-move game). The following
holds for the firms’ equilibrium customization choices in the simultaneous-move game.
(i) If q ≤ 0.56 then the Nash equilibrium is (S,S) for any value of K.
(ii) If q ∈ (0.56, 0.63] then the Nash equilibrium is (S,C) for K ≤ r1 and (S,S) for K > r1.
(iii) If q > 0.63 then the Nash equilibrium is (C,C) for K ≤ c2, (S,C) for K ∈ (c2, r1], and (S,S)
for K > r1.
Figure 2 plots c2 and r1 as functions of q.5 Depending on the values for parameters q and K, either
5The number 0.56 is an approximate solution to 81
√
2q = 2(6 + q)2. The number 0.63 is an approximate value of
81/126.
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both firms customize, only the high quality firm customizes, or no firm customizes. Moreover, the
appearance of this sequence of outcomes is monotone in the fixed cost of customization. Specifically,
starting at the equilibrium when K = 0 we always move down the sequence (C,C)–(S,C)–(S,S) as
K increases. Proposition 1 also implies that even if customization is costless, the firms might not
customize in equilibrium. This happens when the quality difference q is small (≤ 0.56).
It is worth noting that while c2 is an increasing function of q, r1 is not. As a result, for fixed K,
the equilibrium does not follow a certain sequence as q changes. This can be seen from Figure 2.
For example, as q increases, the equilibrium changes from (S,S) to (S,C) to (C,C) for small values
of K, and from (S,S) to (S,C) to (S,S) to (S,C) for a range of values of K.
To highlight the effect of q on the equilibrium customization choices, consider K = 0. Customiza-
tion by one or both firms makes the rivals “closer” to each other, thus intensifying price competition.
The smaller is the quality difference, the tougher is price competition. In the extreme (hypothetical)
case in which q = 0 and both firms customize, price competition results in the Bertrand outcome.
This intuition is behind the findings of Proposition 1. When q is small, the firms do not customize
their products in order to avoid a price war. When q is large, the firms customize to take advantage
of consumers’ desires for ideal varieties. The intermediate case involves customization by one of the
firms (firm B).
5 Endogenous-Timing Game
In this section we analyze the firms’ customization decisions in the endogenous-timing game. Figure
3 depicts its extensive form. In period 1 the firms choose simultaneously between selecting their
product types (standard or customized) this period or wait until period 2. We use S, C, and W to
denote these three choices. If both firms selected their product types in period 1, the game proceeds
to the second stage. If one firm chose to wait in period 1, it selects its product type in period 2. If
both firms chose to wait in period 1, they simultaneously select their product types in period 2.
5.1 Preliminary Analysis
We apply directly the results in Hamilton and Slutsky (1993). Because the simultaneous-move game
has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, either the Nash equilibrium is in dominant strate-
gies, or it involves one dominant strategy.6 When the Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies, the
order of product type selection in the endogenous-timing game does not matter. This occurs when
K is neither in between c1 and c2 nor in between r1 and r2. There are multiple subgame perfect equi-
libria yielding a unique outcome that coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move
game. More specifically, the following holds.
• If K ≤ min{c1, c2}, then both firms select customized products.
6See Lemma I of Hamilton and Slutsky (1993).
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Figure 3: Customization stage of the endogenous-timing game
• If K ∈ (max{c1, c2},min{r1, r2}], then firm A selects a standard product and firm B selects a
customized product.
• If K > max{r1, r2}, then both firms select standard products.
When the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game involves only one dominant strategy,
the endogenous-timing game may lead to different customization choices.7 This occurs when K is
either in between c1 and c2 or in between r1 and r2. Hence, it is left to investigate the four
regions highlighted in Figure 4. As in Hamilton and Slutsky (1993), we will focus on equilibria in
undominated strategies.
The following two lemmas will be helpful for our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 6 (Outcome SS versus outcome CC). ΠSSA ≥ ΠCCA and ΠSSB ≥ ΠCCB for any value of q.
This lemma stipulates that both firms fare better when they produce standard products than
when they customize, even if the fixed cost of customization is zero. Obviously, this is due to the
reduced competition in outcome SS compared to CC.
Lemma 7 (Outcome SC versus outcome CS). ΠSCA + Π
SC
B > Π
CS
A + Π
CS
B for any value of q.
Intuitively, customization makes the low quality firm more aggressive than it does the high quality
firm. Hence, price competition following outcome CS is more fierce compared to that following SC.
This is responsible for the result in Lemma 7 that the industry profit is higher when the high quality
firm customizes than when the low quality firm customizes.
7See Theorem III of Hamilton and Slutsky (1993).
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Figure 4: Regions in which NE of the simultaneous-move game has one dominant strategy
5.2 Region I
Here, we have K ∈ (c1, c2]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game is (C,C) and only
firm B has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction to the endogenous-timing game leads
to the following 3× 3 payoff matrix for the period 1 strategies:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
CC
A −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
(8)
This matrix deserves a discussion. The upper left 2 × 2 submatrix is obvious. Cell (W,W) reflects
the fact that (C,C) is the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. If in period 1 firm A
selects its product type and firm B waits, then in period 2 firm B’s best response is to customize.
This is reflected in the off-diagonal cells of the last column, (S,W) and (C,W). If in period 1 firm
B selects its product type and firm A waits, then in period 2 firm A will match firm B’s selection
(cells (W,S) and (W,C) in the matrix).
Because K ∈ (c1, c2],
ΠSSA > Π
CS
A −K and ΠCCA −K ≥ ΠSCA ,
W weakly dominates S and C for firm A. From Lemma 6,
ΠSSB > Π
CC
B −K
holds for any q and K in region I. It follows that firm B will select a standard product against
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waiting by firm A. The unique Nash equilibrium for matrix (8) in undominated strategies is (W,S).
The outcome corresponding to this equilibrium is SS.8 Observe that, by Lemma 6, this outcome is
Pareto superior to that in the simultaneous-move game.
5.3 Region II
In this region, K ∈ (c2, c1]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game is (S,C) and only
firm B has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction leads to the following game matrix
for period 1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
(9)
This matrix differs from matrix (8) in the last row. If in period 1 firm B selects its product type
and firm A waits, then in period 2 firm A’s best reply will be to make a different selection from
firm B’s. This is reflected in cells (W,S) and (W,C). Cell (W,W) is due to the fact that (S,C) is the
Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game.
It follows from K ∈ (c2, c1] that waiting is a weakly dominant strategy for firm A. We show in
the Appendix that for any q and K in region II
ΠSCB −K > ΠCSB . (10)
Hence, firm B will choose either C or W against firm A’s waiting. The Nash equilibria for matrix
(9) in undominated strategies are (W,C) and (W,W). Both yield outcome SC, the same as in the
simultaneous-move game.
5.4 Region III
In this region, K ∈ (r1, r2]. The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game is (S,S) and only
firm A has a dominant strategy. Applying backward induction leads to the following matrix for
period 1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSSA ,ΠSSB
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSSA ,ΠSSB
(11)
8Matrix (8) has two Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies (C,C) and (C,W), with outcome CC.
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Here, firm B has a weakly dominant strategy to wait. Because
ΠSSA > Π
CC
A −K
holds for any q and K in region III by Lemma 6, firm A will choose either S or W against waiting
by firm B. The Nash equilibria in undominated strategies for matrix (11) are (S,W) and (W,W).
Both yield outcome SS, the same as in the simultaneous-move game.
5.5 Region IV
Region IV turns out to be most interesting. In this region, K ∈ (r2, r1]. The Nash equilibrium of
the simultaneous-move game is (S,C) and only firm A has a dominant strategy. Applying backward
induction leads to the following matrix for period 1:
Firm B
Firm A
S C W
S ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
C ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB ΠCCA −K,ΠCCB −K ΠCSA −K,ΠCSB
W ΠSSA ,Π
SS
B Π
SC
A ,Π
SC
B −K ΠSCA ,ΠSCB −K
(12)
In this matrix, firm B has a weakly dominant strategy to wait. Firm A will choose C against firm
B’s waiting if
ΠCSA −K ≥ ΠSCA ,
or, equivalently,
K ≤ ΠCSA −ΠSCA =
2
9
.
In this case (C,W) is the unique Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies, with outcome CS. Note
that firm B is worse off compared to the simultaneous-move game.9 For the other case in which
K > 2/9, (S,W) and (W,W) are Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. Both yield outcome SC,
the same as in the simultaneous-move game. It is shown in the Appendix that both of the above
two subregions of region IV are non-empty.10
5.6 Summary and Discussion
Let us summarize our analysis of the four regions. For the firm that does not have a dominant
strategy in the simultaneous-move game, waiting is a weakly dominant strategy in the endogenous-
timing game. Hence, the firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-move game (firm
B in regions I and II, firm A in regions III and IV) can potentially enhance its position in the
endogenous-timing game. Indeed, this firm can secure its equilibrium payoff from the simultaneous-
move game by playing its dominant strategy in period 1 of the endogenous-timing game. However, it
9This is because ΠCSA −K ≥ ΠSCA and ΠSCA + ΠSCB > ΠCSA + ΠCSB (Lemma 7) imply ΠCSB −K < ΠSCB .
10Matrix (12) has two Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies (S,C) and (W,C), with outcome SC.
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can change its payoff by playing its dominated strategy in period 1. It will do so if that is beneficial.
Specifically, we have the following.
• The firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-move game does not benefit from
the endogenous-timing game in regions II and III and the upper portion of IV. Both firms
receive the same payoffs in the endogenous-timing game as in the simultaneous-move game.
• The firm that has a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-move game benefits from the
endogenous-timing game in region I and the lower portion of IV. The other firm is also better
off in region I, but is worse off in the lower portion of region IV.
The next proposition points out the differences between equilibrium outcomes in the simultaneous-
move and endogenous-timing games.
Proposition 2 (Endogenous-timing game versus simultaneous-move game). The following compar-
ison holds between the simultaneous-move and endogenous-timing games.
(i) If 0.63 < q ≤ 2.74 and K ∈ (max{0, c1}, c2], then the endogenous-timing game results in both
firms selecting standard products, whereas in the simultaneous-move game both firms cus-
tomize.
(ii) If q > 2.84 and K ∈ (r2,min{r1, 2/9}], then the endogenous-timing game results in firm
A selecting a customized product and firm B selecting a standard product, whereas in the
simultaneous-move game the opposite occurs.
For all other parameter configurations the two games yield the same outcome.
Combining the results in this proposition with Figure 3 leads to Figure 5, which presents the
equilibrium customization choices in the endogenous-timing game.
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that both quality difference and endogenous timing play
important roles in determining the equilibrium outcome. Indeed, if the quality difference is small
(q ≤ 0.56) then no firm customizes in both simultaneous-move and endogenous-timing games, re-
gardless of the level of K. However, when the quality difference is large, firms are sufficiently
differentiated. Customization by one or both firms may occur and the simultaneous-move and
endogenous-timing games do not always lead to the same outcome. In the endogenous-timing game,
the firm that does not have a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-move game has an incentive
to wait, and the firm that has a dominant strategy can achieve a different outcome from that of the
simultaneous-move game by playing its dominated strategy in period 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied customization in the presence of quality differentiation. Our model
has two firms that are initially differentiated horizontally and vertically. Customization affects hor-
izontal but not vertical differentiation. We show that product quality affects the firms’ equilibrium
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Kq
r1
c2
c1
r2
2
9
0.56
0.63 1.43
2.74
2.84
2.92
outcome
SS
outcome
SC
outcome
CC
outcome
SS
outcome
CS
outcome
SC
Figure 5: Equilibrium customization choices in the endogenous-timing game
customization choices. In particular, no firm will customize if the quality difference is small, regard-
less of the fixed cost of customization. For sufficiently large quality differences, customization by
one or both firms may occur. Because the high quality firm benefits more from customization than
the low quality firm, the high quality firm is more likely to customize. This result is supported by
many real-world observations. We do not see customized low quality bicycles and shoes. As another
example, Timbuk2 customizes its messenger bags, whereas lower quality bags made by many other
manufactures are not customized.
Endogenous timing in customization choices may enable the firms to achieve a Pareto superior
outcome by avoiding a price war that would follow customization by both firms. This happens when
the high quality firm is the only firm with a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-move game.
While in the simultaneous-move game the low quality firm never customizes alone, in the endogenous-
timing game it can obtain an advantage by becoming the first and only firm to customize. This
happens when the low quality firm is the only firm with a dominant strategy in the simultaneous-
move game.
There are a number of directions that can be taken to extend the present paper. One extension
is to make the range of customization a continuous choice variable. Such a model would involve a
fairly complex analysis. We believe that the qualitative results of our paper will hold; e.g., the range
of customization of the higher quality firm is larger than that of the lower quality firm. Another
interesting extension is to introduce dynamics into the model to address the roles of customization
and quality in entry deterrence.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 3/2 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). Straightforward algebra implies
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
q + pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB
)
in this case. The profit maximizing first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and
profits as in part (i) of the lemma. It is left to verify that under these prices the indifference
line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square. Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and
x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + pSSB − pSSA
)
=
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
≥ 0,
x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 + pSSB − pSSA
)
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
< 1
hold for q ≤ 3/2. In fact, x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2.
(ii) Consider 3/2 < q ≤ 3 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown
in Figure 2(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
4q
(1 + pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 14q (1 + pB − pA)
2 .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− q + 1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
< 0,
x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
4
(
−3 +
√
1 + 16q
))
∈ (0, 1]
hold for 3/2 < q ≤ 3. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 3/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.
(iii) Consider q > 3 and suppose the indifference line (5) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(pB − pA) and DB(pA, pB) = 1
q
(q + pA − pB) .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (iii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
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Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
2
(
1− 2
3
q
)
< 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
q
)
> 1
hold for q > 3. Note that x̂(0) = 1 when q = 3.
Proof of Lemma 2. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1 and suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = 1− 12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) =
1
2
q + pA − pB.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (i) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = 1− q + pCSB − pCSA =
2
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = 1 + pCSB − pCSA =
2
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1. Note that x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.
(ii) Consider q > 1 and suppose the indifference line (6) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q − 1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
2
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
2
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 1. Note that x̂(1) = 0 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Each case is proven in turn.
(i) Consider q ≤ 1/2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(a). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) = −12q + pB − pA and DB(pA, pB) = 1 +
1
2
q + pA − pB.
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The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (i) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the top and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≥ 0 and x̂(0) ≤ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + pSCB − pSCA =
1
3
− 2
3
q ≥ 0 and x̂(0) = pSCB − pSCA =
1
3
+
1
3
q < 1
hold for q ≤ 1/2. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2.
(ii) Consider 1/2 < q ≤ 2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown
in Figure 2(b). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
2q
(pB − pA)2 and DB(pA, pB) = 1− 12q (pB − pA)
2 .
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (ii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the left and bottom sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed,
x̂(1) = −q + 1
2
√
2q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
2
√
2q ∈ (0, 1]
hold for 1/2 < q ≤ 2. Note that x̂(1) = 0 when q = 1/2 and x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.
(iii) Consider q > 2 and suppose the indifference line (7) intersects the unit square as shown in
Figure 2(c). The firms’ demand functions are
DA(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
−1
2
+ pB − pA
)
and DB(pA, pB) =
1
q
(
q +
1
2
+ pA − pB
)
.
The first-order conditions yield the equilibrium prices and profits as in part (iii) of the lemma.
Under these prices the indifference line intersects the right and left sides of the unit square.
Algebraically, x̂(1) ≤ 0 and x̂(0) ≥ 1. Indeed,
x̂(1) =
1
3
− 2
3
q < 0 and x̂(0) =
1
3
+
1
3
q > 1
hold for q > 2. Note that x̂(0) = 1 when q = 2.
Proof of Lemma 4. The results follow immediately from the first-order conditions.
Proof of Lemma 5. The expressions for c1, c2, r1, and r2 as functions of q follow immediately from
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Lemmas 1 through 4,
c1 =

(
2
3 − 16q
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2 , if q ≤ 1
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 12 (1− 16q)2 , if q ∈ (1, 32]
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 1q (1+√1+16q8 )3 , if q ∈ (32 , 3]
1
q
(
1
3q +
1
6
)2 − 19q = 19 + 136q , if q > 3
c2 =

1
9q −
(
1
3 − 16q
)2
, if q ≤ 12
1
9q − 116
√
2q, if q ∈ (12 , 2]
1
9q − 1q
(
1
3q − 16
)2 = 19 − 136q , if q > 2
r1 =

(
2
3 +
1
6q
)2 − 12 (1 + 16q)2 , if q ≤ 12
9
16
√
2q − 12
(
1 + 16q
)2
, if q ∈ (12 , 32]
9
16
√
2q −
(
1− 1q
(
1+
√
1+16q
8
)2) −5+3√1+16q
8 , if q ∈
(
3
2 , 2
]
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − (1− 1q (1+√1+16q8 )2) −5+3√1+16q8 , if q ∈ (2, 3]
1
q
(
2
3q +
1
6
)2 − 49q = 29 + 136q , if q > 3
and
r2 =
{
4
9q −
(
1
3 +
1
6q
)2
, if q ≤ 1
4
9q − 1q
(
2
3q − 16
)2 = 29 − 136q , if q > 1
Tedious but straightforward numerical calculations confirm that ci < rj for i, j = 1, 2 and any given
value of q.
Proof of Proposition 1. The results follow immediately from Lemma 5 and the discussion preceding
Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. The expressions for ΠSSA and Π
SS
B as functions of q are given in Lemma 1.
Numerical calculations confirm that ΠSSA > Π
CC
A = q/9 and Π
SS
B > Π
CC
B = 4q/9 for q < 3. For
q ≥ 3, ΠSSA = ΠCCA and ΠSSB = ΠCCB .
Proof of Lemma 7. It follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that
ΠCSA + Π
CS
B =
{
5
9 − 19q + 118q2, if q ≤ 1
1
q
(
5
9q
2 − 19q + 118
)
, if q > 1
and
ΠSCA + Π
SC
B =

5
9 +
1
9q +
1
18q
2, if q ≤ 1/2
5
8
√
2q, if q ∈ (12 , 2]
1
q
(
5
9q
2 + 19q +
1
18
)
, if q > 2
Obviously
ΠCSA + Π
CS
B > Π
SC
A + Π
SC
B
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holds for q ≤ 1/2 and q > 2. Straightforward calculations show that the inequality also holds for
q ∈ (1/2, 2].
Proof of (10). It suffices to show that
ΠSCB −ΠCSB > c1
holds for q > 2.74. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply ΠSCB −ΠCSB = 4/9. Straightforward calculations confirm
that 4/9 > c1 for q > 2.74.
Proof of non-emptiness of the two subregions of region IV. For q > 3,
r1 =
2
9
+
1
36q
and r2 =
2
9
− 1
36q
.
Hence,
r2 <
2
9
< r1,
from which non-emptiness of the two subregions of region IV follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. The results follow immediately from Proposition 1 and the discussion of the
four regions preceding this proposition.
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